DNV·GL



DNV GL Cyber secure class notation Information Day September 11th 2020

1 DNV GL © Maritime Cyber Security SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER

Agenda

- Digital vulnerabilities in the maritime sector
- DNV GL guidelines for cyber security
- The DNV GL Cyber secure class notation
- DNV GL Cyber secure type approval
- DNV GL cyber security certification, testing and advisory services
- Some references



Digital vulnerabilities in the maritime sector

DNV GL assessment for Norwegian Authorities*/ Lysneutvalget , April 2015 *Ministry of Justice and Public Security

Top 10:

- Lack of attention and training
- Navigation Signals from a satellite is normally not protected against modification
- System for identification of the vessel is normally not protected against modification
- Remote Maintenance
- A large number of parties are exchanging a lot of information on unsecured email
- Separation of computer networks
- Use of mobile storage devices
- Booking systems and administration systems are vulnerable
- Lack of physical security for server rooms, wiring closets, etc.
- Limited user authentication against systems for public reporting



DNVGL-RP-0496 Cyber Security resilience management for ships and mobile offshore units in operation



DNVGL-RP-G108 Cyber security in the oil and gas industry based on IEC 62443





- Developed as a Joint Industry project (JIP)
- Participants: ABB, DNV GL, Emerson, Equinor, Honeywell, Kongsberg Maritime, Lundin, PTIL, Shell, Siemens and Woodside
- Started April 2016
- Released the RP at Offshore Europe September 2017

Cyber Security best practice



Process

- Establish a Cyber Security Management System
- Update your procedures to reflect cyber security best practices
- Implement the management system into your organisation

Technology

- Ensure segregation of your networks and secure network boundaries
- Secure systems and components
- Install systems to identify, protect, detect, respond and recover.

People

- Train your onboard & shore personnel
- Train system responsible personnel
- Perform incident response & recovery training

ISA/IEC 62443 Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems



How to implement 62443



Define System Under Consideration Do a risk assessment Define zones and conduits Define Security Level Target

Protection against...

Intentional Violation Using Sophisticated Means with Extended Resources, IACS Specific Skills & High Motivation

Intentional Violation Using Sophisticated Means with Moderate Resources, IACS Specific Skills & Moderate Motivation

Intentional Violation Using Simple Means with Low Resources, Generic Skills & Low Motivation

Casual or Coincidental Violation

62443-2-1 Cyber Security Management System (owner)



Maritime Cyber Security

The DNV GL Cyber Security Class Notation



The DNV GL Cyber Security Class Notation "One size fit all"?

- Which systems to include?
- How much risk reduction is wanted/achievable?



Systems included

The DNV GL Cyber Secure

Risk reduction Intended for NB + FIS Cover IMO.428(98) requirements Requires management system (CSMS) for FIS SP-3 Focus on external barrier defence: Zones and conduits SP-1 Remote access SP-0 DNV GL Cyber secure Removable devices Systems included Malware Propulsion Steering Incident handling and reporting Watertight integrity Fire detection and mitigation Limited in depth protection SP-0: Ballasting Thrusters not part of propulsion functions – 8 requirements for 11 systems Power generation supplying essential and important systems Auxiliary systems for essential and important systems Ignition source control **Navigation** Communication

The DNV GL Cyber Secure (Essential)

- **Risk reduction** Intended for NB + FIS Cover IMO.428(98) requirements Requires management system (CSMS) for FIS SP-3 Barrier defence: Zones and conduits SP-1 DNV GL Cyber secure Essential) Remote access SP-0 DNV GL Cyber secure Removable devices Systems included Malware Propulsion Steering Incident handling and reporting Watertight integrity Fire detection and mitigation • Essential in depth protection SP-1: **Ballasting** Thrusters not part of propulsion functions – 46 requirements for 11 systems Power generation supplying essential and important systems Auxiliary systems for essential and important systems
 - Ignition source control Navigation

The DNV GL Cyber Secure (Advanced)

Intended for NB

- Cover IMO.428(98) requirements
- Requires management system (CSMS) for FIS
- Barrier defence:
 - Zones and conduits
 - Remote access
 - Removable devices
 - Malware
 - Incident handling and reporting
- Advanced in depth protection SP-3:
 - 88 requirements for 11 systems



The DNV GL Cyber Secure (+)

- Intended for NB + FIS
- Cover IMO.428(98) requirements
- Requires management system (CSMS) for FIS
- Barrier defence:
 - Zones and conduits
 - Remote access
 - Removable devices
 - Malware
 - Incident handling and reporting
- Limited in depth protection SP-0 for 11 systems
- In depth protection for systems included
 - SP 1-4 based on risk assessment



Required documentation/verification to obtain the DNV GL Cyber secure class notation



An example of a Zone and conduit drawing



5.2 Initial system selection

Cyber physical systems in [5.3] to [5.5] that possess any of the following capabilities, shall be subject to verification of security capabilities in these rules.

- remote connection (from outside the vessel)
- connected and/ or integrated (with other systems)
- possibility for software updates (of application and/ or operating systems).



Systems	Remote Connection	Connected /Integrated	Software Updates
Propulsion – CPP control system	x	N/A	х
Propulsion – RPM control system	x	N/A	х
Propulsion – Electrical propulsion thruster control system	x	N/A	х
Propulsion – Electrical propulsion drives (PTI/PTO)	x	N/A	х
Steering – Rudder control system	N/A	N/A	х
Steering – Azimuth thrusters control system	N/A	N/A	N/A
Steering – Electrical azimuth thruster drive	N/A	N/A	N/A
Power generation – Main engine control system	x	N/A	х
Power generation – Aux engine control system	x	х	х
Power generation – Aux generator control system	x	x	х
Power generation – Power management system	x	x	х

Classification - product certificate/type approval

Product

Certificate

- Classification of control, monitoring, alarm and safety systems consist of the following activities
 - 1. Plan approval
 - 2. Manufacturing survey/FAT
 - 3. New-building inspection
 - 4. FIS survey

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CERTIFICATIO	N					
Our ref: A0056120	Date/pla 2016-0					
Report of pending items to allow	certification of the fo					DNVG
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Application/context:	control syste					
Serial/Tag no:	<u>N.A.</u>	This is to certify:				
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Requirements are based on:	DNV Rules fo	Cr004, Cr007, Cr010				
		ABB Automatio	n Products Gr	nbH		
The product / material has been	marked: N1416R2S o	Heidelberg, Baden-	Württemberg, Ge	rmany	,	
Particulars of Vendor and	Purchaser	is found to comply with				
Vendor:	ABB Oy, Mar	DNV GL rules for classif	cation – Ships, offsh	ore unit	ts, and high speed an	d light c r aft
Vendor reference:	_CVX-003122					
Purchaser:	Meyer Werft	Application :				
Purchaser reference:		Product(s) approved by by DNV GL.	this certificate is/ar	e accep	ted for installation o	all vessels classed
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DNV GL as Maritime Advisory & Testing

Overview of Advisory Services – Assessment



Cyber risks assessment



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Almost Certain		5					Syster	n
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System group	R
Ballasting system	25
Propulsion & steering system	25
Power generation systems	20
Navigation planner	20
Stability Monitoring system	20
Man overboard system/CCTV	16
Muster Evacuation Monitoring	16
Energy management system	16
Environmental systems	16
Position fixing and navigation systems	16
Hospitality management	16
Security systems	16
Security Incident Report Platform	16
Emergency power systems	15
Inventory system	12

Promoting Cyber Security awareness is easy through e-learning

- Module 1: How you can help protect yourself and your organisation (10min)
- Module 2: Common threats & traps (15min)
- Module 3: Best practices (15min)
- Module 4 : Advanced defence in depth course (20min)

Available through our on board solution

Direct Ob.

distributor

DNV GL - Maritime uploaded a video 1 month ago

3:34

Introduction to Cyber Security in Maritime and Offshore

DNV GL - Maritime 1 month ago • 337 views





Penetration testing of OT systems

Vulnerability spot-checking of most critical IT/OT systems using white/grey box testing





OT penetration testing:

- Deep system and domain knowledge necessary
- Tailored configurations and bespoke protocols
- Often fragile and safety critical systems

